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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
OF CLAUDIUS W ALLICH,
Deceased.

FRED R. W ALLICH,

No. 9144

Claimant and Appellant,

A. C. W ALLICH,
Claimant and Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Claudius Wallich died on May 23, 1958 within
and a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
Decedent left a Last Will and Testament and three
Codicils thereto, all of which were admitted to probate in the District Court of Salt Lake Caunty. Under
decedent's Last Will and Testament dated October
11, 1950 and Codicil thereto dated April 10, 1952,
which is identical with Paragraph 7 of the Last Will
with the exception of the naming of Fred R. W allich
as an additional Trustee, said Paragraph 7 as so
amended in the Codicil provides as follows:
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"7. I hereby give, devise and bequeath ~y
vacant lot located on Grixdale Avenue in Detro1t,
Michigan, to A. C. Wallich, said son of my deceased
brother, Charles J. Wallich, to be his own separate
property. I further hereby give, devise and bequeath
to the said A. C. Wallich and the said Fred R. Wallich, the property owned by me located at No. 9721
Petosky, Detroit, Michigan, and an additional sum
of $10,000.00 cash, to be held by them in trust, nevertheless, for the use and benefit of my sister, Wilhelmina W allich, they to use and dispose of said property and money in such manner as they may jointly
determine, for the use, benefit, comfort and well being of m said sister, Wilhelmina Wallich during her
lifetime, and upon her death, if any part of said
monies or if said property still remains in the trust,
then the said A. C. Wallich shall have such remainder of said property held in trust as aforesaid,
as his sole separate property, free of the trust herein imposed. The said A. C. Wallich and Fred R.
Wallich shall act as Trustees hereunder without the
necessity of furnishing any bond and without the
necessity of accounting to any Court or any person
or party concerning their administration of the trust
herein imposed upon them."

Wilhelmina Wallich predeceased the testator,
dying on April 26, 1956. On February 5, 1959 the
Executor filed its first and Final Account and Petition for distribution, which Petition was set for hearing on the 18th day of February, 1959, at which time
A. C. W allich appeared by counsel and objected to
the granting of said ePtition upon the ground that
it failed to recognize the provisions of paragraph
7 of the Will as amended by the Codicil as above
set out. The said Petition treated the $10,000.00 bequest as having lapsed (7-22.) On February 18~
1959 the Executor and A. C. Wallich through his
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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counsel entered into a stipulation providing for the
retention of the sum of $15,000.00 cash by the Executor and authorizing the distribution of the remainder of the estate pursuant to the Petition of
the Executor, said $15,000.00 to be held by the Executor pending the determination by the Court of
the right of A. C. W allich to receive the same pursuant to paragraph 7 of said Last Will as amended,
(R-49). Pursuant to said Stipulation and said Petition, the Court on February 24, 1959 distributed
all of the assets of said estate, except said sum of
$15,000.00 cash, to the beneficiaries under said Will.
That the property on hand with said Executor at the
time of said distribution had a market value of
$27L270.89, (R-43). That there were distributed to
Fred R. W allich as Trustee of the residuary estate
assets of the value of about $150,000.00, (R-95). The
objection of A. C. Wallich was referred to the trial
Court. for determination. A pretrial was held on
the 5th day·~£ Jurie, 1'959 before Jtid'ge M~rrill C.
Faux. Thereafter the matter came on regularly for
trial before the Hon. Ray Von Cott Jr. on the 13th
day of July, 1959. That on the 3rd day of September, 1959 the Hon. Ray VanCott Jr. made and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Judgment upholding the objection of A. C. W allich
and direct~n'*,4b.f3 ~:;::X:~\!tor.:ottP:e~estaJe of Claudius
W allich, deceased,. to· pay to A. c~ Wailich. the· sum
of $10,000.00 plus interest thereon at the rate of 6
per cent per annum from February 24, 1959 until
paid.
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On October 1, 1959 Fred R. Wallich filed his
Notice of Appeal and Statements of Points. The
Executor has not appealed.
RESPONDENT'S POINTS
POINT I:

DEATH OF LIFE TENANT WILHELMINA PRIOR TO DEATH OF TESTATOR, CLAUDIUS W ALLICH RESULTED IN THE VESTING OF THE REMAINDER INTEREST IN A. C. W ALLICH AS OF THE DEATH OF THE
TESTATOR.

POINT II: TESTATOR IS PRESUMED TO HAVE
INCORPORATED IN HIS WILL AND
CODICILS THE PROVISIONS OF
74-2-28 U.C.A. 1953.
POINT III: TESTATOR'S INTENTION MUST BE
DETERMINED FROM THE WILL.
.·~-'-.
yt~,·r, . .•. .
: .. •t!,__!iiiAD
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LIFE TENANT \(ILHEU,-IINA PRIOR
OF TESTATOR, CLAUDIUS WALLICH,
IN THE VESTING OF THE REMAINDER
IN A. C. \iALLICH AS OF THE

DEATH OF THE TESTATOR.

Ja ...,..time. he· ma.de.~).__will an<dn1tte Codicils
ther~' ~audiiis ·vla1lich --was-a. resident Of the State
of Utah, his Will was executed in the State of Utah,
and so far as said paragraph 7 is concerned, disposed of personal property in the State of Utah and
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he died within and a resident of the State of Utah,
therefore the laws of the State of Utah govern.
Utah Code Annotated 1953:
"74-2-28 INTERESTS IN REMAINDER NOT
AFFECTED-The death of a devisee or legatee of
a limited interest before the testator's death does
not defeat the interest of persons in remainder who
survive the testator."

While our Supreme Court has not construed this
section of the tSatute, this section of the Statute was
adopted by Utah from the California Probate Code
and is verbatum with Section 140 thereof.
Section 140 has been construed by the California Court in the following cases.
In Re: Lawrence Estate
108 p 2d 893
Supreme Court (California) 1941
In this case the testator directed that the remainder of his estate be all used to purchase a refund
type annuity in favor of his friend Black. The testator further provided that in the event of the death
of Black any unused payments of annuities were to
go to a charity. Black predeceased the testator and
no annuity was purchased. The trial court upheld
the contention of the heirs that the bequest to Black
had lasped because he predeceased the testator
and that said remainder over to the two charities
was contingent and that said remainder over was
destroyed by failure of the intervening life estate.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The lower court was reversed and the excerpts
of the opinion reversing the lower court and applying section 140 of the Probate Code which was and
is identical with 74-2-28 U.C.A. 1953 and the same
as the early Section 1344 of the California Civil
Code.
IN RE: LAWRENCE ESTATE 108 P 2nd 893
CALIFORNIA 1941.
"The heirs in the case contend that it is obvious
that the primary thought of the testator herein was
to provide for his friend Black; that the provision as
to the charities was secondary and subordinate thereto; and that said provision naming the charities
was only a contingent remainder, based on the following contingencies: (1) That Black survive the
testator; (2) that a refund type of annuity be
purchased; and (3) that there be a remainder of
such principal from this specific annuity left upon
the death of Black. They further contend that the
testator did not intend the charities to have his entire estate, but only the unspent remnant remaining
at the end of the life of Black, which under the
normal life expectancy of Black would be nothing.
Examining the will before us, we are of the
opinion that the general intent of the testator, as
expressed therein, was to provide for Black during
his life, and that thereafter any of the estate remaining was to go to the two named charities. 0 0 0 "
"In our opinion none of the three contingencies
set forth by the heirs must occur in order to permit
the vesting of the interest of the charities. It is
provided in Probate Code, section 140, that: "The
death o.f a devisee or legatee of a limited interest before the testator's death does not defeat the interest
of persons in remainder who survive the testator."
Therefore the fact that Black, the legatee of the
limited interest, predeceased the testator does not
defeat the interest of the charities.
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Another California case cited with approval and
discussed in the Lawrence case is the following
case:
In RE:

Gregory Estate
108 p 566

In this case the testator gave all of the rest, resirue and remainder of the estate in trust to Olive
Blanchard for the use and benefit of the wife of
the testator with payments of $30.00 per month and
with the further provision of paying any remainder
to a granddaughter and grandson. The Court in
this case held that despite the fact that the wife
died prior to the testator and that no trust fund was
set up as made and provided under 1344 which is
identical to our 74-2-28 that there was no lapse and
that the estate vested in the granddaughter and
grandson upon the death of the testator.
We call the court's attention to the language
appearing in the court's opinion in the Lawrence
case at Page 897 P 2d paragraphs 12 and 13, wherein the Gregory case is fully discussed.
The California Supreme Court, In Re McCurdy's
Estate, 240 Pac. 498 (Cal. 1925), held that a remainder interest under a testamentary trust vested at the
date of the death of the testator where the life tenant
predeceased the testator. Under the trust considered the trustee had the right to invade corpus for
the support and maintenance of the life tenant and,
in addition, the life tenant had a general power of
appointment over the corpus of the trust
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The McCurdy's case is also referred to in the
Lawrence case at Page 896 of 108 P 2d.
Even in the absence of a status such as ours,
under similar facts the courts under the common law
have ruled that there is no lapse where the life
tenant dies before the remainderman. One of the
leading early cases that has been cited in many
subsequent cases, particularly with respect to defining the distinction between a condition precedent and a condition subsequent, is the case of
Parker vs. Parker, 123 Mass. 584.
In a brief presented in the lower court all of the
cases cited support the contention of Respondent
and no cases were cited by the opposition to the
contrary. Among some of the leading cases under
identical facts cited to the lower court which uphold
the Respondent's position and the trial court's decision are the following: Hoss vs. Hoss, 39 NE 255
Ind.; Gingrich et al. v. Gingrich, 45 NE 101 Indiana;
Thompson v. Thornton, 83 NE (Mass.) 880; Jackson
v. Knapp, 130 NE 524 Ill.; Hite et al. v. Hook, 96
NE 2d 23 Ohio; Restatement, Property, Parts 1 and
2, 230; Burnett v. McHaney, 148 SW (2d) 324 Mo.
1940); Taylor v. Wendel, 4 Brad£ 324 (N.Y., 1857);
Prescott v. Prescott, 7 Met 141 (Mass. 1843); Goodson
v. Goldsmith, 131 Tex. 418, 115 SW (2d) 1100; Fordham's Will, 235 NY 384, 139 NE 548; United States
Trust Company of New York v. Hogencamp, 191
NY 281, 84 NE 74; Price v. Talkington, 27 SE 2d 705
W. Va. 1943; life tenant with right to dispose of
property and power to appoint any remainderman;
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9

Hite v. Hook, 96 NE 2d 23 (Ohio 1949); Clark v. Mack,
126 NW 632 (Mich. 1910); Nelson v. Meade, 149 Atl.
626 (Me. 1930) and Am. Jur., Wills, 1432, P. 960. See
annotation in 3 ALR 2d 1419 and 133 ALR 1367.
POINT II
TESTATOR IS PRESUMED TO HAVE INCORPORATED IN HIS WILL AND CODICILS THE PROVISIONS OF 74-2-28 U.C.A.
1953.
The will in question having been made in Utah
by a Utah resident, and disposing of personal property in Utah, and is being probated in Utah, is
governed by the Utah Statute and under the authorities testator is presumed to have intended the
Statute to apply. The cases also hold that testator
is presumed to have known of the antilapse Statute
and its effect on the bequest. The Court's attention
is invited to the fact that there was no competent
evidence before the court of any kind to rebut this
presumption. The Court's attention is invited to
the following:
96 C.J.S. 1057

·~..

,

In accordance with the rule stated in Evidence
S 132 that all persons are presumed to know the
law, the will must be presumed to have been made
with knowledge by the testator of the existence of
the statute and its effect in preventing the legacy
from lapsing; and, unless an intent to the contrary
is shown, the court must read the statute into the
will, since it is presumed that the testator intended
the statute to apply. 0 0 0
See note 77 to above quotation, citing cases.
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IN RE:

EVERETT'S ESTATE

28 N. W. 2d 21 (Iowa)
"Testatrix is presumed to have known of the antilapse statute and its effect on the bequest to her
husband in the event he predeceased her. Mason v.
Mason, 194 Iowa 504, 511, 188 N.W. 685; In re Estate of Schroeder, supra; 69 C.J. 1061, section 2279.
If testatrix did not intend section 633.16 to apply,
:;he could easily have made the bequest to her husband conditional upon his survival of her. In re
Estate of Davis 204 Iowa 1231, 1235, 213 N.W. 395,
396; in re Estate of Schroeder, supra; Longerbeam
v. Iser, 159 Md. 244, 150 A. 793, 794. The effect of
a reversal would be to write such condition into her
will. o o o "

POINT III
TESTATOR'S INTENTION MUST BE DETERMINED
FROM THE WILL
Utah Code Annotated 1953:
"74-2-2. INTENTION TO BE ASCERTAINED
FROM WORDS OF WILL.-In case of uncertainty
arising upon the face of a will as to the application
of any of its provisions, the testator's intention is
to be ascertained from the words of the will, taking
into view the circumstances under which it was
made, exclusive of his oral declarations."

See ALR 94, Pages 26 to and including Page 293.
This point is so well covered and so thoroughly
annotated, particularly the issue of Latent and Patent Ambiguities and Extrinsic, we feel it is only
necessary to invite the Court's attention to the annotation appearing in 94 ALR at Pages 36 and including 293.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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REPLY TO APPELANT'S BRIEF
The finding and conclusions are sufficient to
support the judgment as noted on Page 1 of this
Brief. Paragraph 7 of the Will provide:
0 0 0
, then the said A. C. Wallich shall have such
remainder of said property held in trust as aforesaid, as his sole separate property, free of the trust
herein imposed." (Emphasis supplied)

"

In the Lawrence case decided by the California
Supreme Court hereinbefore cited there was a requirement that the Executor use the entire estate
after payment of debts and costs of administration
to purchase a refunding annuity for Black, the life
tenant. The court held it was not necessary that
this annuity come into existence despite the fact
that the provisions of the will provided that the refund therefrom should go to the remainderman.
The court held that the entire residue of the testator's estate vested in the remainderman absolutely
upon the death of the testator. Moreover, in re:
Gregor's estate cited above Olive Blanchard was
to receive the property in trust and she was to pay,
after the death of the life tenant, the residue to the
granddaughter and grandson of the testatrix. The
trust never came into existence, yet the court held
that the entire fund vested in the granddaughter
and grandson of the testatrix, upon the death of the
testratrix.
Thompson v. Thornton 83 NE 880 is another case
where there were provisions with respect to a trust
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and were also the precise words "if any thereof be
left" were used, yet the court held although the life
tenant died prior to the testator that the property
immediately vested in the remainderman upon the
death of the testator. Others of the cases cited above
also use the precise words "if any thereof be left"
particularly Hite et al. v. Hook 96 NE 2d 23.
Also in the case of Hoss v. Hoss, 39 NE 255, the
provisions of the will contained the following:
"These bequests are made upon the condition that
said E. J. Hoss will agree with my executor to do
this." Here the court held that despite the fact that
it appeared there was such a condition that nevertheless where performance was by an act of God
rendered impossible, performance was then excused and title immediately vested upon the death
of the testator. Counsel for the Appellant heard
all these cases cited and discussed in the trial court
and were requested to cite any cases to the contrary. No cases to the contrary were cited or called
to the trial court's attention and none have been
included in Appellant's Brief on appeal, all cases
being unanimous in holding immediate vesting
without the necessity of the trust coming into ex·
istence.
Counsel attempted to draw some inference from
the fact that said Fred W allich was named as a cotrustee with A. C. W allich by decedent's Codicil
dated April 10, 1952 modifying Paragraph 7 of the
Will. The only inference that could be appropriateSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ly or reasonably drawn from such amendment is
that the testator was mindful of the fact that A. C.
W allich was to receive anything that was left after
the death of Wilhelmina and the testator was most
anxious to see that A. C. W allich would not be too
conservative with the $10,000.00 and therefore appointed Fred W allich as co-trustee to make sure
that the $10,000.00 would be used as the needs required rather than having A. C. W allich conserving
it, knowing that all of the remainder would be his
after the death of Wilhelmina.
Moreover, we invite the Court's attention to the
fact that the testator Claudius W allich is presumed
to have intended that title and ownership of all the
property mentioned in Paragraph 7 would vest in
A. C. W allich upon the death of said testator should
Wilhelmina predecease him. In support of this contention we again call the Court's attention to Point
II of Respondent's Brief and the authorities therein
cited.
Again improper inferences have been attempted
by Appellant's counsel in their Brief with respect
to the fact that the title to the Petosky property was
conveyed by Claudius Wallich during his lifetime
to A. C. W allich. The record, Exhibit 2, shows that
the deed to the Petosky property was executed on
the 18th day of August, 1953. Thereafter under
date of January 7, 1954 the testator, Claudius Wallich
executed a third Codicil which has been duly admitted to probate and which Codicil made no
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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change in said Paragraph 7, but contained the following provision:
"In all other respects I hereby approve and confirm the provisions of my said Will and of my said
two Codicils thereto, my said Will and Codicils
being modified and changed only as herein in this
Third Codicil provided."

As previously stated in our Brief, by using the
above language Claudius is presumed to have intended that the provisions of Paragraph 7 should
by reason of the Utah statute cause the immediate
vesting of the property described therein in A. C.
W allich upon the death of Claudius W allich should
Wilhelmina predecease Claudius W allich.
Moreover Claudius W allich after having deeded
the property and knowing that A. C. W allich had
sold the same, still made no change in his Will
except to confirm and republish Paragraph 7. See
third Codicil dated January 7, 1954. In addition to
the presumption that exists under the lq.w it was obvious that the testator accelerated his aid to Wilhelmina during his lifetime by deeding the Petosky
property to A. C. W allich. The only inference that
could be drawn from Exhibit 3 is that A. C. Wallich
voluntarily made a gift to Aunt Kate of the remain·
der of the proceeds of the sale of the Petosky property.
The Court's attention is also invited to the fact
that in clear and concise language the testator indicated a desire to provide for the care of WilhelSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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mina during her lifetime with the property set out
in Paragraph 7 and should she not live to enjoy
it, A. C. W allich should have the same. Should
Appellant's contention prevail, the result would be
that the residuary estate would be enlarged from
$150,000.00 to $160,000.00 A. C. Wallich would be
deprived of property the testator expressly indicated and intended that A. C. W allich should have
and enjoy. We concur with Appellant in the citation of 74-2-2 which provides that the intention is
to ascertained from the words of the Will and also
with respect to 74-2-1 that the testator's intention
governs.
We invite the Court's attention to the fact that
nowhere in Appellant's Brief are any facts stated
or referred to which were submitted to · the trial
Court which would in any way overcome the presumption existing in Respondent's favor that the
testator knew the law and intended that should
Wilhelmina predecease him that the bequest made
under Paragraph 7 would immediately vest in A. C.
Wallich upon the death of Claudius W allich.
While the testator, Claudius W allich could have
anticipated the prior death of Wilhelmina, he made
no provisions for such contingency.
Also, while the Appellant has made absolutely
no reference to the testimony of Fred W allich, appellant does state, "it would seem" which might infer some attention should be given such testimony.
First: There was no ambiguity in the Will and therefore any testimony attempting to vary the same was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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inadmissable. Second: Fred W allich, being a party
to these proceedings was incompetent to testify under our statute known as the "Dead Man Statute."
Counsel for appellant, on Page 12 of their brief,
state that there is nothing in the will that would
indicate any intention to provide more abundantly
for Mr. A. C. W allich than any other relative. The
short answer to this statement is that the Will plainly
and specifically provides that A. C. Wallich is to
receive $5,000.00, and in addition, the remainder of
the property described in Paragraph 7. Bequests
to relatives vary. For instance, the will itself shows
that Christina Stephens, a niece, was given a bequest
of $10,000.00 and under Paragraph 4 of the first codicil to the will, dated April 10, 1952, this is raised
to $15,000.00.
The Court should bear in mind that the maximum
term of the residuary trust of $150,000.00 is five
years. Clearly Wilhelmina could have been amply
supported out of the residuary trust and most certainly would have realized a substantial sum upon
the residuary trust being distributed at the end of
the five years.
In conclusion we submit that the findings and
judgment of the court are amply supported by the
evidence and that the evidence shows that it was
clearly the intention of the testator, Claudius Wailich, in view of the Utah statute, that should Wilhelmina predecease him, A. C. Wallich should be, upon
the death of Claudius Wallich, vested with the ownSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17

ership of the property described in Paragraph 7.
We submit that the judgment of the trial Court
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

MARK, JOHNSON,
SCHOENHALS, & ROBERTS
Counsel for Respondent
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